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INTERNATIONAL LAW-LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
-AssERTION OF CLAIM IN BEHALF OF ITS AGENTS-On September
17, 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte, while on an official tour of duty
as a United Nations Mediator in the Palestine dispute, was assassinated
in Jerusalem. Without proof or charge of complicity by the Israeli
Government, Dr. Ralph Bunche, a personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, accused the Israeli Government of a breach of its duty to make provision for the safety of_United
Nations agents working in areas under its control. The Israeli Government took immediate steps to bring the assassins to justice.1
Because of this tragedy and previous incidents involving injury to
agents of the United Nations, the Secretary-General requested the
General Assembly to explore the subject of reparation to agents or to
their survivors when injured while in the service of the United Nations.
After deliberation by a subcommittee,2 the General Assembly resolved
to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion3 in the following form:
"I. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as
an Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim
against the responsible de jure or de facto government with
a view to obtaining reparation due in respect of the damage caused
(a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons entitled
through him?
·
"IL In the event of an affirmative reply on point I(b), how
is action by the United Nations to be reconciled with such rights
as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a natl.onal."4
. In a decision handed down April 11, 1949, the court unanimously
answered question I(a) (Can the United Nations sue for damages
done to itself?) affirmatively.5 Question I(b) (Can the United Nations sue for damages done to its agents?) was also answered in the
5 United Nations Bulletin 756, 762 (Oct. 1, 1948).
For a history of the submission of the question, see Yuen-Li-Liang, ''Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations," 43 AM. J. INT. L. 460 (1949).
3 See 47 MICH. L. REv. 1192 (1949) for the nature and effect of an advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice.
4 General Assembly Resolution 258 (ill) (Dec. 3, 1948).
5 ''Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations," Advisory
Opinion: I.C.J.Rep. 174 (1949). For a discussion of the opinion and circumstances, see
Quincy Wright, ''Responsibility for Injuries to United Nations' Officials," 43 AM. J. INT. L.
95 (1949) and Quincy Wright, "The Jura! Personality of the United Nations," 43 AM.
J. INT. L. 509 (1949).
1
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affirmative, but over the dissent of four judges.6 On question II, the
majority of the court asserted that a conflict between the agent's national state7 and the United Nations would be avoided because the
United Nations would be claiming only for breach of the obligation
due to it.8
I.

Status of the Agent's Claim for Reparations

An affirmative answer to question I(b) gives origin to the implication that the United Nations is participating merely as a representative for the agent or for his survivors in order to collect their claim
against the defendant state. Traditionally the impact of international
law is on states, not on individuals; the individual has no rights or
duties under international law except through the medium of a state.
Only states can be the subjects of the law of nations. 9 Consequently,
an individual must seek the aid of his national state in order to secure
redress from a defendant state if he has been injured by the latter.
Whether or not his national state will assert his private claim by
diplomatic intercession is a matter wholly within its discretion. Should
it espouse the private claim, the government itself is adjudged the party
claimant. The claim of the individual has merged into a demand of
his government.10 The national state is claiming redress for an injury
committed against it under the theory that the defendant state has
breached its international obligation to provide adequate protection
to nationals of another state.11
6 Judges Badawi Pasha of Egypt, Hackworth of the United States, Winiarski of Poland
and Krylov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissented.
7 Throughout this comment, the term "national state" will be used to designate the
state of which the individual is a national. "Defendant state" will mean the nation which
is responsible for an injury to an individual.
8 Judge Azevedo of Brazil joined the four dissenters in disapproving the solution of
the majority.
9 "Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed, and, if possible, force the
aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain
the chief end of civil society, which is protection." 2 VA'ITBL, LB DnoIT Dss G:BNs, c. 6, §71
(1758), translated by the Carnegie Institute, 1916.
10 United States ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 11 S.Ct. 607 (1891); La
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 20 S.Ct. 168 (1899); Russia v.
Turkey, Hagne Court of Arbitration, July 22/Aug. 4, 1910, 7 AM. J. INl'. L. 178 (1913);
5 HACKWORTH, DmssT OP INl'sRNATIONAL LAw 488 et seq. (1943).
11 ''The wrongful act or omission on the part of a respondent state against a claimant
state may consist of a direct injury to the public property of the latter state, to its public ·
officials, or to the state's honor or dignity, or of an indirect injury to the state through an
injury to its national. • • • The theory of international law is that injuries either to private
persons or to their property, committed contrary to international law, are injuries against the
state whose national the individual is." 1 WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INl'llRNATIONAL LAw
80-82 (1937).

498

Mi:cmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

In recent years writers have sharply attacked this classic approach. 12
Their main criticism is that international tribunals in practice do not
.adhere to the traditional concept of the rights of individuals under international law. For instance, it is the practice of such tribunals to
disallow claims espoused by states on behalf of a national unless he
remain a national of the claimant state to the date of settlement.13
Should title to the claim pass out of the hands of a national by death,
assignment, or other transfer, the national state cannot seek reparation
for the injury. Under the classic approach the injury to the national
was deemed to be an injury to his state. But how can the state's claim
for an injury to itself be satisfied by a transfer in ownership of the
private claim? Despite the violence done to the classic theory, international tribunals insist that the rule of continuing nationality be
observed.
A second variation from theory evolves from the practice of granting awards to states "in behalf of" the individual claimants.14 The
reparations are in fact calculated on the extent of the casualty suffered
by the private claimant in all but exceptional cases.15 Practice in the.
normal case bespeaks that the state is merely a collection agent for the
12 Borchard, ''The Access of Individuals to International Courts," 24 AM. J. !NT. L.
359 (1930); JEssuP, A MoDERN LAw OF NATIONS, c. 5 (1948); KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAw AND STATE 342-3 (1945); Koessler, "Governmental Espousal of Private Claims
before International Tribunals," 13 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 180 (1945); WILLIAMS, AsPECTS
oF MoDERN INTERNATIONAL LAw, c. 2 (1939). For a defense of the classic theory in view
of these criticisms, see Eagleton, "The Individual and International Law," 1946 PRoc. AM.
s. !NT. L. 22.
13 Burthe v. Denis, 133 U.S. 514, 10 S.Ct. 335 (1890); RALsToN, THE LAw AND
PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TIUBUNALS, rev. ed., 161 (1926). Some authority holds
that the individual must remain a national only up to the time of presentation before the
tribunal. Cf. 5 HACKWORTH, D:rcBsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 804 et seq. (1943).
14 "[T]he apparent harshness of the principle that states alone can sue or be sued in
international proceedings is largely mitigated in practice by the acceptance of the theory
that a state is always entitled to make the cause of a national its own cause, and to treat a
wrong done to its national by another state as a wrong done to itself." WILLIAMS, AsPECTs
oF MoDERN INTERNATIONAL LAw 24 (1939); BoRCHARD, TBB DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
OF CITIZENS ABROAD 383-5 (1915).
15 "[T]he control of the United States over claims espoused by it before this Commission
is complete. But the generally accepted theory formulated by Vattel, which makes the injury
to the national an injury to the nation and internationally therefore the claim a national
claim which may and should be espoused by the nation injured, must not be permitted to
obscure the realities or blind us to the fact that the ultimate object of asserting the claim
is to provide reparation for the private claimant.•••" Mixed Claims Comm. (United States
v. Germany), Admin. Dec. No. V, 175 at 192 (1924).
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injured national.16 Obviously, if damages are assessecl on the seriousness of an injury to a person, the award can represent no more than
reparations due him.
Another ground for criticism is that the classic theory has sown
the seeds of injustice. One of its products is the lack of legal right in
individuals to summon the resources of diplomatic intervention for the
assertion of their private claims. A government decides whether or
not to espouse a private claim by considering not only its merits but
also extraneous political matters.17 Injustice is also the lot of an injured
person without nationality in that he has no state to which he may
tum for diplomatic protection. The classic theory forbids a state from
interceding in behalf of anyone but its nationals. 18
It has been argued that to acknowledge the individual as a subject
of international law will promote international peace. With such recognition, a private person's difficulties with a foreign country would
automatically be raised to a national level with the attendant questions
of foreign policy and national honor. In addition it is contended that
the policy emphasizing the individual will check the menace of state
promotion of private economic interests.19
In the past, certain treaties have given private parties the right to
appear before international tribunals and arbitral commissions. 20 These
16 Recognizing this conllict between theory and practice, the Permanent Court of
International Justice said, "It is a principle of International law that the reparation of a
wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the
injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law••••
The reparation due by one State to another does not however change its character by reason
of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage
suffered by a private person is taken as the measure. • • • Rights or interests of an individual
the violation of which rights causes damage are always in a different plane to rights belonging to a State, which rights may also be infringed by the same act. The damage suffered
by an individual is never therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a
State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to
the State." Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 17, 27-28
(1928); 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF lNrERNA'I'IONAL LAW 719 (1943).
17 Borchard, "The Access of Individuals to International Courts,'' 24 AM. J. INT. L.
359 (1930).
18 Infra, note 35.
10 J:sssaP, A MonBRN LAw 01' NATIONS 99 (1948).
20The first instance was provided in the Rhine Treaties of 1815, 1831 and 1869;
CHAMBERLAIN, THB REGIME OF lNrERNATIONAL Rrvims: DANUBE AND Rlmra 186, 201,
237 (1923). The convention for the establishment of the Central American Court of
Justice, 1907, also gave individuals the right to raise claims, "whether their own government
supports said claims or not." RALSTON, lNrERNA'I'IONAL AlmITRATION FROM ATHENS TO
LoCARNO 240 (1929).
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treaty-created bodies have acted directly upon the claims of individuals,
and judgments have been rendered in their favor. In effect individuals
have been dealt with under these treaties jn the same manner as states
normally are treated. Furthermore, many courts and writers have unwittingly demonstrated that the protecting state exerts its diplomatic
inB.uence as a mere representative of the private claimant. These authorities concede that the individual claimant would have no standing
save as he is represented by a state, but emphasize that action is taken
on the substance of the claim as if it were solely that of the individual. 21
A clear indication of the metamorphosis of international law is furnished by the courts which have reached decisions on the assumption
that rights of private persons have international effectiveness. The
cases involving the Calvo clause supply a much debated illustration.
A Calvo clause is a provision which South American countries incorporate into business contracts between their governments and aliens
whereby the alien promises not to invoke the aid of his government in
case of dispute arising under the contract.22 Of the thirty-two reported
cases, sixteen have upheld the validity of the Calvo clause or have
assumed that the clause might have some effect to bar the claimant or
his government from appearing before an international commission. 23
One notable example occurred in a case before the United StatesMexico Commission.24 The Commission said that a private person
cannot use a Calvo clause to "deprive the government of his nation
of its undoubted right of applying international remedies to violations
of international law committed to his damage." 25 However, the Commission continued, "But while any attempt to so bind his government
is void, the Commission has not found any generally recognized rule
of positive international law which would give to his government the
right to intervene to strike down a lawful contract."26 The Commission held that the contractor's claim for breach could not be presented
by the United States because his suit related only to the interpretation
21 Z & F Assets Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 61 S.Ct. 351 (1941); 2 HYDE, hrrERNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., 888 (1945); RALsToN, THE LAW AND PROCEDURES OF hrrERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS, rev. ed., 230-1 (1926).
22 5 HAcKWOR'l'H, DIGEST OF hrrERNATIONAL LAw §530, p. 635 (1943); 2 HYDE,
hrrERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., §305 (1945).
23 BRIGGS, LAW OF NATIONS 541-2 (1938).
24 United States ex rel. North American Dredging Co. of Texas v. Mexico, Gen. Claims
Comm. (United States v. Mexico), Opinion of the Commission 21 (1927).
25 Id. at 25.
26 Id. at 26; 5 HACKWOR'l'H, DIGEST OF hrrERNATIONAL LAw 641-3 (1943).
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or fulfillment of the contract. 27 Because of the Calvo clause, the Commission declared that the claimant should have resorted to the Mexican courts for his remedy, although the treaty establishing the Commission provided that no claim should be disallowed for failure to
exhaust local remedies. 28
A clearer illustration of the recognition of an individual's rights
under international law is furnished by The Tattler Case. 29 In that
case the arbitral commission held that an individual had the power to
make an effective waiver of his claim and that of his government after
the injury had been sustained. The national state presenting the claim
argued that a private waiver could not bind it because it was asserting
a claim for injury to itself under the classic theory. The commission
denied the argument and dismissed the claim.30
In the principal case, the Court of International Justice held that
"[T]he United Nations, as an Organization, ... [has] the capacity
to bring an international claim ... in respect of the damage caused ...
to the victim or to persons entitled through him." 31 In reaching its
decision the court stressed that the traditional theory of diplomatic
protection rests on two bases: (1) that the defendant state has breached
an obligation to the national state in respect to one of its nationals and
(2) that only the party to whom an international obligation is due can
bring a claim for its breach. The court stated that these bases apply
to the United Nations when it presents a claim for damages suffered
by one of its agents. In the event the defendant state is a member
state, the United Nations is bringing its charge against the defendant
state for breach of the obligation to render every assistance to the
2 7 Accord: United States on behalf of International Fisheries Co. v. Mexico, Gen. Claims
Comm. (United States v. Mexico), Opinion of the Commission 207 (1931); 5 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OP INTERNATIONAL LAw 643-7 (1943).
28 Article V of the treaty between the United States and Mexico establishing the commission provided: "[N]o claim shall be disallowed or rejected by the Commission by the
application of the general principle of international law that the legal remedies must be
exhausted as a condition precedent to the validity or allowance of any claim." 43 Stat. L.
1730 at 1734 (1923). On this point, see Lipstein, "The Place of the Calvo Clause in International Law," 22 BR1TT. YEARBOOK OP INT. L. 130, 144-5 (1945).
2 9 NmLsEN, REPORT OP AMEmcAN AND BRITISH CLAIMS ARBITRATION 489 (1926).
30 "[I]t has been objected that the renunciation of and guarantee against any claims
are not binding upon the Government of the United States, which presents the claim. But
in this case the only right the United States Government is supporting is that of its national,
and consequently in presenting this claim before this Tribunal, it can rely on no legal ground
other than those which would have been open to its national." Id. at 491; 5 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST oP lNTERNATIONAL LAw 492 (1943).
311.C.J.Rep. 174at 181 (1949).
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United Nations.32 Non-members owe the United Nations the obligation to recognize that the vast majority of states have the power to
create an international organization "possessing objective international
personality ... with capacity to bring international claims."33
Dissenter Hackworth claimed that the privileged position of agents
of the United Nations was designed not to benefit the individual
agents but to inure to that organization. 34 Consequently, any claim
for breach of obligation with respect to agents should be covered under
question I(a) for damages done the United Nations. Thus the dissent
sharpens the implication of the majority that the decision is one which
increases the standing of individuals in international law.

2.

The Agent's Bond of Employment with the.United Nations

Under traditional international law, the .first essential of diplomatic
intervention is that the individual be a national of the interceding
state.36 The protective function of a state is restricted to the benefit
of its nationals. The reason for so limiting diplomatic intervention is
that the function is reciprocal to the obligation of nationals to render
service and allegiance to his state.36 This requirement of nationality
results in cases of injustice. For example, a stateless individual has
no nation to which he can turn for diplomatic aid. 37 Another problem
U.N. Charter, Art. 2, ,is.
33J.C.J.Rep. 174 at 185 (1949).
34 Id. at 196-204, concurred in by Judge Winiarski.
36 "This right (of a state) is necessarily limited to intenrention on behalf of its own
nationals, because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between
the state and the individual which alone confers upon the state the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic protection that the right to take up
a claim and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged. Where
the injury was done to the national of some other state no claim to which such an injury
may give rise falls within the scope of the diplomatic protection which a state is entitled to
afford nor can it give rise to a claim which that state is entitled to espouse." Case of the
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 76 at 16 (1938); 5 HAcKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 802-3 (1943); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL I.Aw, 2d ed., 893-9
(1945).
36 United States on behalf of Edgar A. Hatton, Gen. Claims Comm. (United States v.
Mexico), Opinion of the Comm. 6 (1929); 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
I.Aw 802-3 (1943). Borchard develops the argument that because the end of a state is to
ensure the collective security and welfare of the nation and the personal security and welfare
of each individual, diplomatic protection of nationals is a function resulting from the nature
of a state. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS .ABROAD 32 (1915).
37 "A State .•• does not commit an international delinquency in inflicting an injury
upon an individual lacking nationality, and consequently, no State is empowered to intervene or complain on his behalf either before or after the injury." United States on behalf of
Dickson Car Wheel Co. v. Mexico, Gen. Claims Comm. (United States v. Mexico), Opinion
of the Comm. 175 at 188 (1931).
32
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is created by dual citizenship, when the injured individual is a national
of the defendant state. The "solution" of international commissions
has been to forbid one national state from extending its diplomatic
protection to persons who are at the same time nationals of the defendant state. The right of a state to deal with its own nationals is
superior to its duty to deal fairly with aliens.38
In several situations the sine qu~ non of nationality has been
avoided. Under the Acts of Congress establishing the first and second
Court of Commissioners of the Alabama Claims, unnaturalized foreigners were permitted to receive the benefits of the acts. 39 Again states
have made representations on behalf of oppressed peoples not on the
legal rights of nationality but on the grounds of humanitarian appeal.4°
In one area the restriction of nationality has broken down. Employment of an alien by a foreign government may give that government the power to assert an international claim on his behalf. Thus
aliens who serve aboard the vessels of a foreign nation-whether the
vessel be privately or governmentally owned-have received the benefit
of the employer nation's intervention.41 Aliez:is serving in the military
38 "The practice of nations in such cases (of dual nationality) is believed to be for their
sovereign to leave the person who has embarrassed himself by assuming a double allegiance
to the protection which he may find provided for him by the municipal laws of that other
sovereign to whom he thus also owes allegiance. To treat his grievances against that other
sovereign as subject of international concern would be to claim a jurisdiction paramount to
to that of the other nation of which he is also a subject. Complications would inevitably
result, for no government would recognize the right of another to interfere thus in behalf of
one whom it regarded as a subject of its own." Alexander (Great Britain) v. United States,
1871, 3 MooRE, DIGEST OF lNrERNA'I'IONAL AlmITRA'I'IONS 2531 (1898).
39 BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMA'l'IC PROTEC'l'ION OF CrnZENS AnRoAD 463 (1915). Treaty
between United States and Great Britain concluded May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. L. 863; Act of
June 5, 1882, 22 Stat. L. 98.
40 Jessup, "The Defense of Oppressed People," 32 AM. J. hrr. L. 116 (1938).
41 Canada submitted a claim against the United States for compensation for injury suffered by the crew and owners of the ship, "I'm Alone." Among the items submitted was one
for the death of a French sailor who had been a crew member. "I'm Alone Case," Joint
Interim Rep. of the Commissioners, Dept. of State Puhl., Arbitration Ser. No. 2(6), 35
(1933). Because of the sailor's nationality and because his widow and children who would
receive the reward were French citizens, the United States argued that Canada should not
be permitted to assert the claim. Id. at 70, 92. However the Commission awarded Canada
reparations for the death of the French sailor for the benefit of his French wife and children.
"I'm Alone Case," Joint Final Rep. of the Commissioners, Dept. of State Puhl., Arbitration
Ser. No. 2(7), 4 (1935). Accord: Francis McCready (United States) v. Mexico (1868),
3 MooRE, DIGEST OF lNrERNA'I'IONAL AlmITRA'l'IONS 2536-7, 2771 (1898); Patrick Shields
(United States) v. Chile (1894), 2 MooRE, DIGEST oF lNrERNA'I'IONAL AlmITRA'I'IONS
1478 (1898) which dismissed the claim of the United States Government against Chile for
injury to Shields, a British subject. However, later the Chilean Government agreed to settle
by payment to the United States, 3 MooRE, lNrERNA'I'IONAL LAw DIGEST 797 (1906). In
re Ross, 140 U.S. 453,472, 11 S.Ct. 897 (1891); 5 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST oF lNrERNA'I'IONAL
LAw 818-9 (1943).
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forces42 or in the diplomatic services43 of a nation are entitled to that
nation's diplomatic protection. It has been claimed that the assertion of
a right to recover for injury to diplomatic agents is a right growing out
of the agents' representative character rather than out of the theory of
diplomatic intercession on behalf of nationals. 44
The present case extends the rule that employment justi:6.es diplomatic intervention, regardless of actual nationality. This equation of
the bond of employment with the bond of nationality for the purpose
of bringing international claims is challenged by Judge Hackworth.45
He emphasizes that the contract between the United Nations and its
agents was not intended to have the effect of expatriating the employee
or substituting allegiance to the United Nations for allegiance to his
state. Also, Judge Hackworth points up the problem that will arise
if the United Nations as well as the national state has the power to
sponsor a claim on behalf of a United Nations' agent. As a result the
defendant state would face the possibility of two demands and the injured agent would not know to whom to appeal for aid. The decision
might have the unfortunate effect of creating another impasse where
the agent is a national of the defendant state.
On the other hand the majority of the court indicates that it is
necessary that officers of the United Nations be independent of their
respective national states in order to ensure the effectiveness of that
organization.46 To carry out this objective the Charter necessarily
implies that the United Nations has power to assert claims on behalf
of its agents. 47 The majority agrees that the bond of employment is
42 A United States citizen who entered the military service of Mexico could not present
a claim as a United States national against Mexico for unpaid salary: John Cole (United
States) v. Mexico (1876), 3 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL Aru3ITRATIONS 2467-2468
(1898); see also 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 813 (1943).
43 Employment of a Turkish citizen by the United States Consular Agency in Turkey
permitted the United States Legation to intervene on behalf of the Turkish employee to
assert his privileges from local law resulting out of his status as a servant of a foreign government: Case of G. Costa, 2 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST 742-3 (1906). Accord:
Case of A. Kassas and Case of Avedikian, id. at 740, 743. See also 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST
oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 510 (1943). It has been held that a state may present a claim on
behalf of a national principal against whose alien agent the wrong was committed: United
States on behalf of John A. McPherson, Gen. Claims Comm. (United States v. Mexico)
Opinion of the Commission 325 (1927).
44 JESSUP, A MoDERN LAw oF NATIONS 118-9 (1948).
45 I.C.J. Reports 174 at 201 (1949).
46 Id. at 183.
47 ''The Court understands the word 'agent' in the most liberal sense, that is to say, any
person who, whether a paid official or not, and whether permanently employed or not, has
been charged by an organ of the Organization with carrying out or helping to carry out, one
of its functions-in short, any person through whom it acts." Id. at 177.
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not the same as the bond of allegiance, but states that only the United
Nations can bring a claim for breach of an obligation to it. The state
of nationality could not recover for that element of the injury if it
alone could bring a claim on behalf of a United Nations' agent.
3.

Conclusion

The result of the decision (in addition to establishing the right
of the United Nations to bring an international claim for damage
caused to itself) is to give individuals who serve as agents of the United
Nations two alternative procedures for collecting damages for injuries
involving the responsibility of a state. This in itself is an enhancement
of the position of individuals in the eyes of international law. Secondly, question I(b) frankly recognizes that the claim the United
Nations would assert would be solely for damage done the individual.
An affirmative answer to question I(b) indicates that the United Nations can act as a mere representative of the injured agent to obtain
reparations for him. Thirdly, the bond of employment is candidly
treated as the sole basis for permitting the United Nations to bring a
claim on behalf of an employee. Thus it clearly appears that the right
of diplomatic protection may rest on either of two bases-nationality
or employment.

Paul E. Anderson, S. Ed.

